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Abstract - The paper undertakes a policy analysis of the remedy of specific
performance. It compares the approach of the Draft Common Frame of Reference
with the domestic legal systems of selected common law and civil law countries of
the European Union with respect to specific performance. The paper then turns to two
dilemmas facing any policy judgment about the availability of the specific
performance showing no insurmountable policy argument against the remedy.
Afterwards, the remedy of specific performance is placed within the framework of
legal certainty. In concluding the paper, a case is be made for the general availability
of specific performance as fostering legal certainty within the European legal space.
A. INTRODUCTION
Contract law in Europe has undergone the process of Europeanisation.'
One example of such Europeanisation is the Draft Common Frame of
Reference ('DCFR') published in 2009, which contains the Principles,
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. The Expert Group
on European Contract Law, mandated by the European Commission, has
2
recently published its report. However, analysis of the latter will be
omitted as it is focused on the narrow subject of sales of goods and lacks
detailed discussion of remedies.
The destiny of the DCFR is not yet clear. There are several possible
options to implement it: a non-binding instrument, a European directive,
a regulation or even a European civil code. 3 The European Parliament
supports the adoption of an optional instrument by means of a Regulation
1 On which see Reinhard Zimmermann, 'Comparative Law and the Europeanization
of Private Law' in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 539.
2 A European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses: Publication of the Results
of the Feasibility Study carried out by the Expert Group on European Contract Law
for Stakeholders' and Legal Practitioners' Feedback
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/feasibility-studyen.pdf> accessed 15 April
2012.
3 Green Paper from the Commission on Policy Options for Progress towards a
European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses, Brussels (2010) <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0348 :FIN:en:PDF >
accessed 15 April 2012.
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encompassing the contract law rules (points 4, 5, 24 of the 8 June 2011
Resolution).4
Under the DCFR the creditor can generally avail himself of the
remedy of specific performance, subject to certain exceptions. However,
not all countries in the European Union are enthusiastic about the remedy
of specific performance. Despite the overall tendency of convergence of
the diverging legal systems,5 a rather small, but quite important minority
of States representing the common law world grant the specific
performance only in exceptional cases, whereas civil law countries are in
general more inclined to allow such a remedy.
The purpose of this paper is to undertake a policy analysis
concerning whether it is advisable to adopt the DCFR's favourable
position on specific performance, particularly in light of the report of the
House of Lords concluding against the harmonization of the general law
of contract - including the adoption of specific performance as a primary
remedy. 6 Chapter B of the dissertation will compare the approach of the
DCFR with the domestic legal systems of selected common law and civil
law countries of the European Union with respect to specific
performance. Chapter C will turn to two dilemmas facing any policy
judgment about the availability of the specific performance. Chapter D
will be devoted to the concept of legal certainty. In concluding the
dissertation, a case will be made for the general availability of specific
performance as fostering legal certainty within the European legal space.
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This Chapter will have the initial purpose of providing a brief overview
of the remedy of specific performance in the DCFR and three municipal
legal systems, namely England and Wales, France and Germany. In
4 European Parliament Resolution of 8 June 2011 on Policy Options for Progress
towards a European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses (2011/2013(INI))
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference
=P7-TA-2011-0262> accessed 15 April 2012).
Rend David and Camille Jauffret-Spinozi, Les grands systhmes de droit
contemporains (11h edn, Dalloz 2001) 8.
6 House of Lords, European Union Committee, European Contract Law: The Draft
Common Frame of
Reference, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/1d200809/ldselect/ldeucom/95/
95.pdf>, accessed 15 April 2012, 19.
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addition, the use of the specific performance in the transnational context
will be analysed.
1. DCFR
The DCFR is not a mere reproduction of a particular national legal
system. It is an instrument which tends to find acceptable solutions for all
legal systems. Despite that, the remedy of specific performance is
generally granted to the creditor, something that a civil law jurist would
likely to be pleased to find. The DCFR recognises the specific
performance of both monetary obligations, including secondary
obligations, such as the payment of interest 7 (III. - 3:301), and non-
monetary obligations (III. - 3:302).
The right to claim specific performance for monetary obligations is
not available in cases in which the creditor has not yet performed the
reciprocal obligation for which payment will be due and it is clear that the
debtor in the monetary obligation will be unwilling to receive
performance (III. - 3:301(2)), provided that one of the following
conditions is met:
(a) the creditor could have made a reasonable substitute
transaction without significant effort or expenses; or
(b) performance would be unreasonable in the circumstances.
For this exception the drafters of the DCFR provide one example: when
the debtor indicated to the creditor his unwillingness to receive the
specific performance before the execution has started.8
As mentioned above, the specific performance for non-monetary
obligations, including remedying free of charge of a performance which
is not in conformity with the terms regulating the obligation, is in
principle permitted (III - 3:302) if requested in time (III. - 3:302(4)).
The drafters of the DCFR decided to provide for exceptions to the
specific performance. This, however, does not affect the award of
damages (III - 3:303) as the latter question falls under DCFR III. - 3:104.
The remedy of specific performance is refused in the following three
7 Christian von Bar and Eric Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of
European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Full Edition
(Sellier 2010) Vol. 1, 825.
8 ibid 825-826.
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cases:
1. Unlawfulness or impossibility of the performance. The
commentary explains that temporary impossibility does not
permanently exclude the right to claim specific performance; 9
2. Performance would be unreasonably burdensome or
expensive;' 0 or
3. Personal character of the performance.
This third exception derives from the desire to protect human rights and
freedoms of the debtor." It can only be relied upon when enforcement
would be unreasonable on the facts of the case.12 This requirement seems
to have been construed narrowly by the drafters of the DCFR. Thus,
contracts of employment are said to be generally enforceable provided
that the obligation is not 'of a highly personal nature'. 1 3 The Commentary
to the Principles of European Contract Law ('PECL') states that the said
exception does not cover negative obligations, namely when a person is
forbidden from doing something. However, if as a result of such an
injunction a person would in fact be forced to execute a positive act, the
exception would be triggered.14
Though not mentioned in the text of the DCFR, an order of specific
performance would also be refused, when it is not reasonably clear what
the debtor is required to do in order to comply with the order.' 5
Aside from these exceptions, the seeming primacy of the specific
performance is also undermined by the duty of the creditor to mitigate the
9 ibid 830.
10 As explained by the drafters of the DCFR: 'Burdensome does not mean financially
burdensome. It is wider than that. It could cover something which involved a
disproportionate effort or even something which was liable to cause great distress,
vexation or inconvenience' - ibid 831.
" ibid 832.
12 Compare to art. 9:102(2)(b) of the PECL which bluntly fenced all contracts for
provision of service or work of personal character off the scope of the remedy of
specific performance.
13 von Bar and Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules ofEuropean Private
Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (n 7) 831.
14 Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds), Principles ofEuropean Contract Law. Parts I
and I (Martinus Nijhoff 2000) 397-398.
1s von Bar and Clive Principles, Definitions and Model Rules ofEuropean Private
Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (n 7) 833. Cf Co-operative
Insurance Society v Argyll Stores [ 1998] AC 113-14.
18
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loss, particularly regarding fungible goods. Thus, the fact of insisting
unreasonably on specific performance in circumstances where the
creditor could have made a reasonable substitute transaction without
significant effort or expense would preclude the creditor from claiming
the increased losses (III - 3:302(5)).
The DCFR arguably gives full effect to parties' agreement on
remedies due to its recognition of the principle of party autonomy (DCFR
II - 1:102). Party autonomy is, however, moderated by the prohibition to
impose unfair contract terms, by the principles of good faith and fair
dealing (III - 3:105) and arguablyl 6 by the impossibility of changing the
procedure and enforcement of obligations by mutual consent (DCFR I -
1: 10 1(2)(h)).
2. English Law
Unlike civil law countries, in common law countries remedies precede
and do not necessarily follow the content of rights.' 7 This partially
explains the situation whereby specific performance is not the usual and
natural consequence of a contractual commitment under English law.
This limited availability of specific performance is also explained by the
fact that non-compliance with a judicial order of specific performance
would result in contempt of court. The sanction of the contempt of court
is quite harsh so that the remedy should only be awarded with caution.1 9
It is a well-established rule in English law that the default remedy
for the breach of contract is the award of damages, except for cases when
damages are not an adequate remedy. G. Jones qualifies 'the formula of
the adequacy of damages as a chameleon one'. 2 0 Several cases of
16 Martin Schmidt-Kessel, 'The Right to Specific Performance under the DCFR', in
Gerhard Wagner (ed), The Common Frame of Reference: A View from Law and
Economics (Sellier 2009) 74.
17 Rene David and Camille Jauffret-Spinozi, Les grands systhmes de droit
contemporains (n 5) 262; Lucinda Miller, 'Specific Performance in the Common law
and Civil law: Some Lessons for Harmonisation', in Paula Giliker (ed.), Re-
examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment: Anglo-Canadian Perspectives (Martinus
Nijhoff 2007) 288-289.
18 Daniel Friedmann, 'Rights and Remedies', in Nili Cohen and Ewan McKendrick
(eds), Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (OUP 2005) 4.
19 Gareth Jones and William Goodhart, Specific Performance (2 nd edn, Butterworths
1996) 6.
20 Gareth Jones, 'Specific Performance: A Lessee's Covenant to Keep Open a Retail
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inadequacy of damages include: 1) when the creditor will be forced out of
business, unless he obtains specific performance;21 2) when goods are
unique;22 3) when the performance is due under a long-term supply
contract;23 4) when the breach of duty has an ongoing character;24 5)
(arguably) in case of insolvency of the debtor.2 5
A. Farnsworth argues that the test of adequacy of damages has lost
its dominant importance; nowadays, common law courts compare
remedies in terms of their effectiveness in granting protection to the
26
injured party. The trend towards greater availability of specific
performance is also evidenced by the process of removing some bars to
specific performance (e.g. - the requirement of mutuality).27
However, this liberal tendency seems to have been stopped by the
case of Co-Operative v Argyll in which Lord Hoffman stated that the
remedy of specific performance is 'an exceptional remedy' and limited
the availability of specific performance of contracts for pursuing
activities.28 This case was criticised on the ground that the specific
performance needs to be refused if it causes undue hardship rather than
29because it falls into a pre-determined category of contracts.
Notwithstanding the traditional reluctance to grant specific
performance, English law echoes certain provisions of the DCFR. Firstly,
English law recognises the non-discretionary character of an action for an
Store' (1997) 56 Cambridge L. J. 488-490.
21 Sky Petroleum Ltd. v VIP. Petroleum Ltd. [ 1974] 1 W.L.R. 576. The risk of
forcing the party out of business distinguishes this case from the case of Socidtd des
Industries Mitallurgiques v The Bronx Engineering Co Ltd [ 1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
465, in which the claim of specific performance was rejected.
22 Falcke v Grey (1859) 4 Drew 651.
23 Robert Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance (Canada Law Book Co 1983)
682.
24 S.A. Smith, 'Substitutionary Damages', in Charles Rickett, Justifing Private Law
Damages (Hart Publishing 2008) 106.
25 Ralph Cunnington, 'The Inadequacy of Damages as a Remedy for Breach of
Contract', in Charles Rickett, Justijying Private Law Damages (n 24) 118-119.
26 Allan Farnsworth, 'Comparative Contract Law', in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 932.
27 Allan Farnsworth, Contracts (4 th edn, Aspen Publishers 2011) 742.
28 B6n6dicte Fauvarque-Cosson, 'Regards Comparatistes sur l'Ex6cution Forc6e en
Nature' (2006) 1 Revue des contrats 259.
29 I.C.F. Spry, The Principles ofEquitable Remedies: Specific Performance,
Injunctions, Rectification and Equitable Damages (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2001)
669 - 671. For contrary evidence see Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] A.C. 691.
20
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agreed sum.30 However, unlike the DCFR, under English law the
payment extended in time (periodical payment of annuities) is subject to
discretionary powers of the court.31 The contract to lend money is not
qualified as a contract to pay a specified sum of money; therefore, an
order of specific performance would not be granted, provided damages
are an adequate remedy.32 In addition, s. 49 of the Sale of Goods Act
(1979) does not recognize the right of the seller to sue for the price of the
title that has not passed to the buyer. 3 3
Following the case of White and Carter (Councils) v MacGregor3 4
the debtor may continue performance and require the payment provided
that the performance may be carried out without co-operation by the other
party, the performing party has a legitimate interest in performance and
that such continuation should not breach the duty to mitigate losses.35
Subsequent cases emphasise the ability of the creditor to stop the debtor
from going ahead with the performance of the contract.36
English courts would not order performance when the costs of
performing an obligation would be disproportionate to the benefits to be
received by the debtor.37 In Co-operative v Argyll, the House of Lords
rejected the obligation to operate an unprofitable business. However, the
strict approach of this case should not be accepted wholesale. In Rainbow
Estates Ltd v Tokenhold Ltd,3 8 the court rejected the application of
limiting factors (e.g. - constant judicial supervision or the precision as to
the content of duties that need to be performed to satisfy the court's order
of specific performance) to the facts of that case considering that those
30 Edwin Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contract (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007)
1092-1100. The House of Lords in White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor
([1962] AC 413) where the issue at stake was the claim of debt rejected use of
discretionary power and granted an order of specific performance.
31 Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 (HL).
32 South African Territories, Limited v Wallington [ 1897] 1 Q.B. 692.
33 Criticized as unreasonable by P.S. Atiyah, John Adams and Hector MacQueen
(eds), Atiyah's Sale of Goods (12 th edn, Longman n 2010) 482-484).
34 White and Carter (Councils) v MacGregor [1962] AC 413. For the same principle
in U.S. judicial practice see Rockingham County v Luten Bridge, 35 F. 2d 301 (4th Cir
1929) 307.
35 Guenter Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract (OUP 1988) 127
36 Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn, OUP 2008)
825-828.
37 Tito v Waddel (No 2) [1977] Ch. 106, 326.
38 [1999] Ch. 64 (Ch D).
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factors are not absolute values but rather matters of degree.3 9
The next exception is the prohibition to impose specific performance
of personal character, which would render the performance unreasonable.
On several occasions, English courts refused to compel the party to carry
out services of personal character unless it was reasonable to do so. 40 The
discretionary judicial analysis of the reasonableness takes into account a
number of factors such as the hardship suffered by both parties where the
personal service is not performed and the degree of judicial
superintendence.41 English courts would be more inclined to grant
42
injunctions rather than orders for specific performance, not least
because such orders infringe less on debtor's freedom and are supervised
* 43
with more ease.
So far, the approaches adopted by the DCFR and English law
intersect frequently. However, quite importantly, a greater number of
exceptions to the specific performance are available under English law in
contrast to the DCFR. Thus, English courts will consider additional
factors to reject a claim for specific performance: the necessity of
constant judicial supervision, set-off,4 4 lack of clean hands, 45 public
policy, 46 lack of equal footing of parties as to the value of goods sold 47
and the impossibility to perform the contract in its entirety.48 Specific
39 Peter Luxton, 'Goodbye Hill v Barclay: specific performance of a tenant's repairing
covenant - Rainbow Estates Ltd v Tokenhold Ltd' (1988) JBL 564, 566.
40 Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (Oxford 2004) 530.
41 Gareth Jones, 'Specific Performance of a Contract of Services?' (1987) 46
Cambridge L. J. 21, 23.
42 Hugh Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (2 8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004), para. 27-
059, cited in S. J. Whittaker, 'Un droit d la prestation plhitot qu'un droit d l'exacution?
R6flexions sur l'ex6cution en nature et r6paration en droit anglais' (2005) Revue des
contrats 49, 53. Compare Co-operative Insurance Society v Argyll Stores [1998] AC
I to the case of Walgreen v Sara Creek Property, 966 F. 2d 273 (7th Cir 1993), in
which the negative injunction was granted.
43 Robert Shape, Injunctions and Specific Performance (n 23) 547-548.
44 David Hayton, Charles Mitchell, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies (12th
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 908.
45 Walters v Morgan (1861) 45 E.R. 1056.
46 Jill Martin (ed), Hanbury & Martin on Modern Equity (17 th edn, Sweet & Maxwell
2005) 754-755.
47 Falcke v Grey (1859) 4 Drew 651.
48 Performance will not be impossible if the debtor can force a company, in which he
has a majority of shares, to perform the contract (Elliott v Pierson [1948] 1 All ER
22
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performance will also be refused when the obligations sought to be
enforced require performance of activities abroad or the property in
question is situated abroad. 49 Finally, more general doctrines can be used
to bar the remedy of specific performance (such as estoppel).o
Even when applying the same exception the scope of English
exceptions is more expansive. Thus, the exception of 'burdensome
performance' in the text of the DCFR seems to be confined only to the
person of the creditor, whereas English law takes into account the burden
which could be imposed on the wife of the creditor.'
As seen, specific performance is not entirely excluded from English
law: a set of circumstances may in certain cases justify the order of
specific performance. This position is at odds with the rule in English
conflict of laws, which plainly refuses recognition of foreign judgments
other than for a 'debt, or definite sum of money', thus excluding specific
performance of obligations provided for by foreign judgments. 52
With regard to the freedom of parties to stipulate the remedy before
the arising of the dispute, the position of English law is not entirely
clear. 5 3 While it seems that courts would be reluctant to enforce party-
agreed specific performance clauses, such reluctance is justified by
invocation of paternalistic concerns 54 and by the argument that parties
cannot oust the power of courts through their private agreement.5 5
However, there has been made a convincing case for the respect of
939). For limitations to the scope of this exception see Jones and Goodhart, Specific
Performance (n 19) 57-61.
49 I.C.F. Spry, The Principles ofEquitable Remedies: Specific Performance,
Injunctions, Rectification and Equitable Damages (n 29) 78.
50 Jones and Goodhart, Specific Performance (n 19) 26.
51 Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch. 30.
52 Lawrence Collins et al. (eds), Dicey, Morris, Collins: The Conflict ofLaws (13th
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 1st vol. 576, though such a judgment can have res
judicata effect.
53 Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (n 40) 505. Quadrant Visual
Communications Ltd. v Hutchison Telephone (UK) [1993] BCLC 442 did not give
effect to contractually-stipulated remedies, however Miller (n 17, 294) argues that the
reason for that may be that plaintiff acted in a dishonest way in that case.
54 Anthony Ogus, 'English Report on Remedies', in Donald Harris and Denis Tallon
(eds), Contract Law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons (OUP 1989) 247.
ss Anthony Kronman, 'Specific Performance' (1978) 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 351, 371.
UCL Journal ofLaw and Jurisprudence
freedom of parties to agree on remedial terms.56 It is unclear why parties
cannot contract on their private matters provided there is no public
interest involved in the case (e.g. - specific performance tantamount to
slavery or protection of weak parties). Moreover, such an approach would
be efficient from the viewpoint of the Coase theorem.
3. French Law
French law recognises the duty of the debtor mis en demeure ('debtor
required by the creditor to comply with his duties') to specifically
perform his contractual obligations. The availability of specific
performance depends on the character of the obligation that the debtor
promised to perform. For the purposes of granting an order of specific
performance, distinction is made between the obligations to 'give' and to
'do' or 'abstain'. The obligations to 'give', including obligations to pay
and to deliver goods, 59 are perfectly susceptible of performance. If the
goods are fungible and the debtor should first individualise them, the
obligation to give is transformed into an obligation to 'do' which is
60
subject to a special regime (see below).
In cases of obligations to 'do' or 'abstain', the principle is reversed:
the specific performance is prohibited (Article 1142 of the French Civil
Code, qualified by Articles 1143 and 1144) due to concerns relating to
the constraint exercised on human personality and the practical
inefficiency of any work exercised under constraint.61 The French case-
law 6 2 reversed this principle by recognising specific performance for
obligations to 'do' or 'abstain' except in strictly personal contracts.63 This
56 Solbne Rowan, 'For the Recognition of Remedial Terms Agreed Inter Partes'
(2010) 126 LQR 448.
5 On which see R Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 1 L. & Econ. 1.
58 Frangois Terr6, Philippe Simler and Yves Lequette, Droit civil. les obligations
(Dalloz 2005) 1059.
59 Civ. 20.1.1953, D. 1953.222, JCP 1953.11.7677.
60 Boris Starck, Henri Roland and Laurent Boyer, Droit civil: les obligations (6 th edn,
Litec 1998) 565.
61 ibid 566.
62 Cass. Civ. 20.1.1953, D. 1953.222, JCP 1953.11.7677, cited in Barry Nicholas, The
French Law of Contract (2nd edn, OUP 1992) 219.63 Genevieve Viney, 'Ex6cution de l'obligation, facult6 de remplacement et r6paration
en nature en droit frangais', in Marcel Fontaine and Genevieve Viney (dir.), Les
sanctions de l'inexdcution des obligations contractuelles: itudes de droit compard
24
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change of the principle is embraced by Avant-projet Catala (Art. 1154)
and the Draft of the Ministry of Justice (Art. 110 & 162) purporting to
amend the French Civil Code. 64 The adoption of latter amendments
would strip French courts of the discretionary power they are said to
enjoy to control the proportionality of a remedy of specific
performance.65
One of the particularities of the French law is that the specific
performance is secured by the imposition of a mechanism of coercion
called astreinte.66 Astreinte consists in imposing a considerably high
judicial fine, 'not depending upon damages,' 67 on the debtor who refuses
to execute specifically his obligations under the contract. The amount of
astreinte is in direct proportion to the time during which the debtor was
reluctant to perform his contractual obligations. 6 8
The astreinte is extremely efficient. While orders of specific
performance can face irresistible obstacles to enforcement, astreinte
provides a very strong incentive for complying with contractual
obligations. Nevertheless, the mechanism of astreinte is not devoid of
deficiencies. The award of an astreinte does not depend on the damage
caused, thus permitting the astreinte to transform itself in a punitive
damage in case the debtor is reluctant to perform his obligations for a
considerable period of time. This feature of the astreinte can convert the
amount of money to be paid due to a breach of contract into a penal rather
(Bruylant 2001) 176-178; Y.M. Laithier, 'Comparative Reflections on the French
Law of Remedies for Breach of Contract', in Cohen and McKendrick (eds),
Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (n 18) 113.
64 Hugh Beale, Bn6dicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Jacobien Rutgers, Denis Tallon and
Stefan Vogenauer, Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (Hart Publishing
2010) 843-844.
65 Judith Rochfeld, 'Remarques sur les propositions relatives A l'ex6cution et A
l'inex6cution du contrat: la subjectivisation du droit de l'ex6cution' (2006) 1 Revue
des contrats 117; John Gotanda, Damages in Private International Law, (Martinus
Nijhoff 2007) 10; Laithier (n 63) 113-114. Nevertheless, there is a recent case law
which denies such discretion to French courts: Cas. Com. 3 dec. 1985, B. IV No. 286,
p. 244 cited in Lando and Beale, Principles ofEuropean Contract Law: Parts I and II
(n 14) 399.
66 Charles Szladits, 'The Concept of Specific Performance in Civil law' (1955) 4 Am.
J. Comp. L. 208, 218.
67 L. 9 juill. 1991, article 34.
68 The mechanism of astreinte is also provided for by Art 111 (3) of the Code
Europ6en des contrats: Giuseppe Gandolfi, Code Europdens des contrats: avant-
projet (Giuffr& 2004) 45.
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than compensatory sanction, 69 which is considered to be non-convenient
for the contractual domain.70 The severe character of astreinte is,
however, mitigated by discretion of the court to reduce the amount of the
provisional astreinte, and, in particular, by Art. 36 of L. 9 juill. 1991
which permits to lift the astreinte when non-performance was induced by
71
extraneous causes.
Impossibility of the performance would preclude any order for
specific performance.72 However, French case law does not recognise an
exception for exceptionally burdensome or expensive performances7 3 due
to the considerations of the sanctity and immutability of contracts.7 4 Nor
is there any proportionality considerations balancing the interest of the
creditor in performance with the expenses incurred by the debtor. Thus,
in one case the debtor was ordered to demolish and reconstruct a house
because of 33 missing centimetres.75 This approach will give the debtor a
strong bargaining power during the negotiations following a judgment for
specific performance which could be used to extract from the debtor more
damages that have been suffered.76
The proposed reforms to the French civil law, namely Avant-projet
Catala and the Draft of the Ministry of Justice, leave the defences
available against a claim of specific performance untouched: the
economic impossibility of the specific performance (disproportionate
character of performance) and the duty to mitigate damages cannot
prevent an order of specific performance from being granted.
69 For this reason a U.S. court (Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens SA v
Southwire Co. (484 F. Supp. 1063 (ND Ga., 1980)) did not enforce an arbitral award
ordering astreinte, on the ground of public policy.
70 See e.g., Solene Rowan, 'Reflections on the Introduction of Punitive Damages for
Breach of Contract' (2010) 30 Oxf I Leg. Stud. 495.
71 Tallon, 'French Report on Remedies', in Harris and Tallon (eds.), Contract Law
Today: Anglo-French Comparisons (n 54) 269.
72 Viney (n 63) 183; Nicholas, The French law of Contract (n 62) 216.
73 Cass. Civ. 3, 9 d6c. 1975, B. III, no. 363, p. 275; Cass. Civ. lere, 16 janv. 2007,
RDC/TBH 2007. 719, obs. D. Mazeaud.
74 Laithier (n 63) 104-105.
75 Fauvarque-Cosson (n 28) 259.
76 ibid.
77 Y.M. Laithier, 'The Enforcement of Contractual Obligations: A French
Perspective', in John Cartwright, Stefan Vogenauer and Simon Whittaker (eds),
Reforming the French Law of Obligations. Comparative Reflections on the Avant-
26
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The effectiveness of party-agreed remedies is not clear in France,78
though it is suggested that agreements to restrict the use of specific
performance are perfectly enforceable.7 9
4. German Law
The starting premise of German law is the availability of a claim for
specific performance for a breach of an obligation, including contractual
obligations (§241(1) BGB). Unlike DCFR and English law, German law
requires from the creditor to grant the debtor a period of grace (Nachfrist)
to keep the contract alive8 o before other remedies (e.g. - damages,
termination) can be requested (§§281(1), 323 BGB).si Consequently, the
creditor is primarily restricted to specific performance.82 However, there
are exceptions for certain cases (§§249(2), 281(2), 283 and 323(2) BGB)
and the period of grace can be substituted by a warning in other cases (§§
323(3), 281(3) BGB).
Under German law, the debtor can be released from the duty to
perform an obligation specifically in a number of exceptional situations. 8 3
First, specific performance is not ordered when performance would be
objectively impossible (§275(1) BGB). The scope of §275(1) BGB
covers also illegality of performance. 8 4
§275(2) BGB, as a manifestation of the principle of good faith,
permits the debtor to avoid specific performance when the performance is
grossly disproportionate to the interest in performance of the creditor.85
Projet de Reforme du Droit des Obligations et de la Prescription ('The Avant-Projet
Catala') (Hart Publishing 2009) 135-137.
78 Ogus,'Summary of Discussion of Remedies', in Harris and Tallon (eds), Contract
Law Today Anglo-French comparisons (n 54) 297.
79 Fauvarque-Cosson (n 28) 259.
8o B.S. Markesinis, Hannes Unberath and Angus Johnston, The German Law of
Contract (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006) 381.
8 ibid 400.
82 Vanessa Mak, Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law
(Hart Publishing 2009) 92-93.
83 Treitel, Remedies (n 35) 52-53.
84 Florian Faust and Volker Wiese, 'Specific Performance - A German Perspective',
in Jan Smits, Daniel Haas and Geerte Hesen (eds), Specific Performance in Contract
Law: National and Other Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2008) 52.
85 Compare with French case-law which orders specific performance of an obligation
even if the interest of the debtor in performance is slight: Beale, Fauvarque-Cosson,
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However, unlike the situations of objective impossibility (§275(1)
BGB),86 the court should not be ignorant of the role of the debtor in
rendering the performance grossly disproportionate. The doctrine limits
87§275(2) BGB to extreme cases and it could not be used in cases of
'economical impossibility' when, for example, prices for the goods
increase drastically; §313 would need to be applied in such a case.8 8 In
addition, the debtor can rely upon §765(a) of the Civil Procedure Code8 9
to discontinue specific performance if severe hardship has emerged after
the order of specific performance was rendered.
The debtor is also protected from being forced to execute a personal
duty (§275(3) BGB). When faced with a contract to execute a personal
duty, the court should weigh the obstacle to the performance of the debtor
against the interest of the creditor in performance. Even if conditions for
applying §275(3) BGB are not met, §888(3) of the Civil Procedure Code
will exclude the forced enforcement of judgments for non-delegable
personal services.
In case of impossibility of performance, other remedies are still
available to the creditor (e.g. - damages) 90 provided the requirements of
§280 BGB are met. By virtue of §326(1) BGB the creditor would also be
exempted from his contractual obligations towards the debtor in case of
impossibility subject to an exceptional case when the creditor contributes
to the situation of impossibility (§326(2) BGB).
An overview of civil procedural rules is necessary to elucidate the
practical application of the remedy of specific performance in Germany.
§888 of the Civil Procedure Code provides for sanctions in case the
debtor does not comply with his duty to specifically perform the contract.
Only when the activity required to perform is dependent exclusively on
Rutgers, Tallon, Vogenauer, Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (n 64) 856-
857.
86 Reinhard Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and
Comparative Perspectives (OUP 2005) 44.
87 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract (n 80) 413.
88 Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative
Perspectives (n 86) 45-46.
89 Cited in Beale et al, Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (n 64) 882.
90 Andreas Heldrich and Gebhard Rehm, 'Modernisation of the German Law of
Obligations: Harmonisation of Civil Law and Common Law in the Recent Reform of
the German Civil Code', in Cohen and McKendrick (eds), Comparative Remedies for
Breach of Contract (n 18) 129.
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the will of creditor and cannot be undertaken by a third party, fines and
imprisonment can be ordered against the debtor, subject to the principle
of proportionality (in case of imprisonment) and ceiling of 25 000 EUR
for fines. 91
§887 of the Civil Procedure Code requires the debtor to contract for
a substitute performance where the obligation to 'do' can be performed
by a third party. It is sometimes argued that the primacy of the specific
performance in civil law countries is a myth. 92 Nevertheless, it would be
rash to qualify specific performance as a myth, because §887 exception is
limited to obligations to 'do'. By contrast, the specific performance of
contracts to give can be forced.
Two other actions available to the creditor are an action to forbear
the debtor from doing something (§890(1) of the Civil Procedure Code)
and the action to force the debtor to pay the money (§803 of the Civil
Procedure Code).93
5. Transnational Context
Point 31 of the European Parliament resolution (8 June, 2011) encourages
the use of the European optional instrument on contractual obligations
within the context of the alternative dispute resolution, allegedly
including arbitration. Accordingly, it is necessary to test the position of
the DCFR which can form the base for such an optional instrument by
reference to the context of international arbitration.
Traditionally, there has been a dichotomy of views about the law
applicable to the issue of remedies in arbitration. The common law world
used to think about remedies as a procedural issue governed by the lex
arbitri.9 4 For instance, s. 48(5) of the English Arbitration Act of 1998
grants arbitrators sitting in England, Wales and Northern Ireland the
power to order specific performance. The application of the lex arbitri to
91 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract (n 80) 405.
92 Henrik Lando and Caspar Rose, 'On The Enforcement Of Specific Performance In
Civil Law Countries' (2004) 24 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 473.
93 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract (n 80) 403, 405.
94 See for the discussion D.R. Munoz, 'The Power of Arbitrators to Make Pro Futuro
Orders', in Michael Schneider and Joachim Knoll (eds), Performance as a Remedy:
Non-Monetary Relief in International Arbitration (New York, 2011) 93. In practice
lex arbitri quite often governs the order of specific performance (Robert Gemmel, 'To
Order Specific Performance?' (2010) 76 Arbitration 467-473).
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the issue of specific performance may lead to a conflict with the
substantive law applicable to the dispute which may have a different
approach to the availability of specific performance. On the other side,
the civil law system treats remedies as a substantive law issue. This view
is supported by Art. 12 of the Rome I Regulation 95 which states that the
applicable substantive law will govern the question of remedies, subject
to procedural limits of the court, as well as by eminent arbitration
scholars. 96
Nevertheless, it is submitted that international commercial
arbitration is not a mere procedural mechanism to solve the dispute
between merchants. The choice of international arbitration, according to
recent studies, impacts upon the content of substantive law that arbitrators
apply. Arbitrators tend to apply legal rules independently from national
legal systems, 9 7 frequently citing 'general principles of law'. One might
here think of the much-debated concept of lex mercatoria.9 8 It was
claimed by a sole arbitrator in Texaco/Calasiatic v Libya that specific
performance is a general principle of law. 99 However, the analysis of
legal systems above shows considerable discrepancies between legal
systems as to whether an order for specific performance should be
granted. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for a rule, in our case specific
performance, to be a general principle of law to be applied by
arbitrators 00 due to the fact that the rules applicable in transnational
context are not mere reproductions of provisions of national legal
systems.101 Almost all major institutional rules require from arbitrators to
95 Council Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (OJL 177,
4.7.2008).
96 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (3rd ed. 2009), Vol. II, 2150.
97 See a PhD project by Joshua Karton, The Culture ofInternational Arbitration and
the Evolution of Contract Law, <http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/people/research-
students/joshua-karton/2114> accessed 15 April 2012.
98 See, e.g., Berthold Goldman, 'The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law -
The Lex Mercatoria', in Julian Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International
Arbitration (Kluwer 1986) 113; Michael Mustill, 'The Lex Mercatoria: The First
Twenty-Five Years', (1988) 4 Arbitr. Int'l 108.
99 Award of 19 January 1977, 17 ILM 1 (1978).
100 For a contrary view see Emmanuel Gaillard, 'Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria:
Towards the Selective Application of Transnational Rules' (1995) 10 ICSID Review
208.
101 Karton (n 97).
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give effect to the substantive content of parties' agreement.102 As a result,
one could, according to one author, argue that arbitrators have the
inherent powerl03 to order specific performance subject to inherent
limitations such as intuitu personae character of the obligation.10 4
6. Preliminary Conclusions
The analysis above shows that specific performance is subject to
diverging regimes in the legal systems compared. Despite some
exceptions which are uncontroversial, such as impossibility, 0 5 the
argument that legal systems reach the same results on the practical level
with regards to the specific performancel06 appears to be an
oversimplification. First, legal systems seem to differ as to the definition
of specific performance. The notion of specific performance is broader in
French and German laws than under English law. The former
encompasses execution of the contract by a third party at the expenses of
the creditor (articles 1143-1144 of French Civil Code, §887(1) German
Code of Civil Procedure), provided there is a preliminary judicial
decision to that effect. 0 7 However, it seems that English courts also have
the power to substitute the performance of a debtor by ordering execution
by a third party.s08 In addition, the civil law concept of specific
performance includes in its scope the negative obligations (prohibitions),
which are enforced through negative injunctions, whereas English law
does not consider them to be part of specific performance,10 9 where they
102 Michael Schneider, 'Non-Monetary Relief in International Arbitration: Principles
and Arbitration Practice', in Michael Schneider and Joachim Knoll (eds),
Performance as a Remedy: Non-monetary Relief in International Arbitration (Juris
Publishing 2011) 4-5.
103 David Munoz, 'The Power of Arbitrators to Make Pro Futuro Orders' in Michael
Schneider and Joachim Knoll (eds), Performance as a Remedy: Non-Monetary Relief
in International Arbitration (Juris Publishing 2011) 109.
104 Carole Malinvaud, 'Non-pecuniary Remedies in Investment Treaty and
Commercial Arbitration' (2009) 14 ICCA Congress Series 212-213.
1os von Bar and Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules ofEuropean Private
Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (n 7) 837.
106 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Katz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn,
Clarendon Press 1998) 484.
107 Beale et al, Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (n 64) 851.
los Rule 8 of the Schedule 1 of the RSC Order 45 (Enforcement of Judgments and
Orders: General).
109 Szladits (n 66) 212.
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are considered to be a manifestation of the compensation for breach of
contract." 0 The DCFR is silent as to the definition of the specific
performance.
English law seems to have more restrictive approach to the specific
performance of monetary obligations than other legal systems."' Except
for rules for particular contractsll2 the civil law systems, in contrast to
English law (White and Carter v McGregor),1 13 do not permit the creditor
to stop the performance which he is not interested in.1 14
Turning to the execution of non-monetary obligations, German and
French laws, unlike English law," 5 require some form of communication
to the debtor about the non-execution of his duties.
It is sometimes argued that substitute performance is the primary
remedy in civil law countries.11 6 This conclusion is doubtful taking into
account that the existence of a cover transaction will not generally force
the creditor to opt for it in most legal systems. 1 7 In English law existence
of a cover transaction would point towards adequacy of damages thus
preventing an order for specific performance. The duty to mitigate
damages is provided for under the DCFR. Interestingly, under English
law the creditor needs to mitigate his damage also in case of a claim for
performance of monetary obligations," 8 whereas under the DCFR he
need only do so for performance of non-monetary obligations.
Exceptions to specific performance are not uniformly applied in
different legal systems, and their scopes diverge throughout EU Member
States. Though substantive provision in civil law countries may entitle the
creditor to sue for specific performance, civil procedural rules can have
110 Treitel, Remedies (n 35) 57.
1 See part B.2 above.
112 G.J.P. de Vries, 'Do Economic Analysis and Fairness Influence the Right to
Performance in Ways Contrary to One Another?' in Smits, Haas and Hesen (eds),
Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (n 84) 331.
113 [1962] AC 413 (HL Sc).
114 Lando and Beale (n 14) 394.
115 Tony Weir, 'Mise en demeure, dommages et int6rits', in Fontaine, Viney (dir.),
Les sanctions de l'inexdcution des obligations contractuelles: itudes de droit compard
(n 63) 966.
116 Lando and Rose (n 92) 20.
117 Laithier (n 63) 115; von Bar and Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of
European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (n 7) 841.
118 Andrew Burrows, 'Legislative Reform of Remedies for Breach of Contract: the
English Perspective' (1997) 1 Edin. L. Rev. 155,157.
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the effect of restricting the availability of that remedy.11 9 It should be
stressed that codification like the DCFR would not be efficacious unless
it will be extended to the area of civil procedure, including interim
measures. Therefore, the DCFR should provide that the application of
procedural rules should not impair the availability of specific
performance.
Analysis of arbitration context also supports the need to render the
remedy of specific performance generally available.
C. Two DILEMMAS
Two fundamental dilemmas lie at the roots of the policy discussions on
the availability of specific performance.12 0
1. Freedom of Debtor vs. Pacta Sunt Servanda
We must first begin by confronting, on the one hand, the freedom of the
debtor to execute or to abstain from executing the contract and, on the
other hand, the expectations of the creditor'21 and the principle of pacta
sunt servanda.122 It is quite often argued that ordering specific
performance would hinder the personal freedom of the debtor and his
right to change his mind.12 3 By contracting, the debtor does not undertake
definitive commitments as the freedom to contract goes along with the
freedom to break promises. 124
However, this argument is flawed. The question of remedies should
119 Lando and Rose (n 93) 20-2 1.
120 For a similar division see Mak, Performance-Oriented Remedies in European Sale
of Goods Law (n 82) 64 -69; Ogus (n 54) 256-262.
121 Lon Fuller and William Perdue, 'The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages'
(1936) Yale L. J 52.
122 The expectations of the creditor are stronger in case of a consumer transaction. The
House of Lords in Co-operative Insurance Society v Argyll Stores [ 1998] AC 1 stated
that as the transaction is commercial, its purpose is to obtain money thus awarding
damages would be an appropriate remedy. It flows from this that in case of consumer
contracts, the purpose of the transaction is rather to satisfy the necessities of the
consumer which are not always able to be expressed in an award of damages.
123 Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract
(Hart Publishing 2004) 96, 114. Compare to the notion of State sovereignty in
investment arbitration acting as a bar for orders of specific performance (e.g. - Art. 26
(8) of the Energy Charter Treaty (signed December 1994, entered into force April
1998, (1995) 34 ILM 360)).
124 Farnsworth, Contract (n 27) 730.
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be analysed in terms of bilateral bargains rather than unilateral
promises.125 In M. Schmidt-Kessel's words: 'freedom presupposes the
126
possibility to bind oneself'. A person can waive in advance his rights
and liberties,12 7 including through undertaking contractual obligations,
subject to respect of the prohibition of self-enslavement.128 Moreover, the
invocation of human rights of the debtor would be contrary to the
principle of estoppel. In light of this, the argument that obligations
created by voluntary undertaking can be performed only voluntarily is not
tenable.129 Rather, justice and fairness oblige a party to keep his words.13 0
A perusal of the rules of positive law shows that courts strive to
balance orders of specific performance with the freedom of debtor. In
particular, in cases when the commitments are particularly personal,
courts would reject a claim for an order of specific performance.
Moreover, the argument of personal freedom works only for a limited
category of cases (personal services) and does not cover other instances
where specific performance could be requested.131
S. Shavell argues that breach of the contract is not immoral, as the
contracts are often incomplete and parties may face situations that have
not been foreseen at the moment of the conclusion of the contract.13 2
Despite the convincing logic of this argument, it needs to be stressed that,
though contracts do not foresee everything, their incompleteness is filled
in by legal default rules which are 'incorporated' into the text of the
contract.
125 James Penner, 'Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract'
(1996) 2 Legal Theory 325.
126 Schmidt-Kessel (n 16) 71.
127 The European Court of Human Rights answers affirmatively to the question
whether a person can waive its liberty in advance. See Audley Sheppard, 'Interim ILA
Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards'
(2003) 19 Arb. Int'l 217, 233-234.
128 Prince Saprai, 'The Principle against Self-Enslavement in Contract Law' (2009) 26
J. Contract L. 25
129 S.A. Smith, 'Performance, Punishment, and the Nature of Contractual Obligation'
(1997) 60 Modern Law Review 360.
130 Peter Linzer, 'On the Amorality of Contract Remedies - Efficiency, Equity, and
the Second Restatement' (1981) 81 Colum. L. Rev. 111, 138-139.
131 Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract (n 123)
96-97; Smith (n 129) 364.
132 Steven Shavell, 'Why Breach of Contract May not Be Immoral Given the
Incompleteness of Contracts?' (2009) 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1569.
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2. Economic Analysis of the Breach of Contract vs. Traditional
Conception of the Breach
The second dilemma opposes, on the one hand, the economic approach to
the contract breach which advocates the efficient breach of the contract
and, on the other hand, the traditional conception of the contract breach
which invokes moral and legal arguments to support the general
availability of specific performance. The economic approach of the
efficient breach departs from the idea that the debtor should breach the
contract each time that would lead to a Pareto improvement, i.e. - when
the debtor is better off by breaching the contract and performing another
transaction while the creditor to the initial contract is not worse off.133
This approach is, in principle, well-reasoned. The property,
including the contractual claims, has an inherent social functionl 3 4 and
agglomeration of efficient breaches would accord with the public interest.
Consequently, the private interest of a party needs to be sacrificed, all the
more so that the debtor receives full compensation. Ordering specific
performance is believed to preclude efficient breaches of contract,
assuming that the contracting parties would not be able to renegotiate the
contract and as a result the debtor would not be able to buy out his duty to
perform. 135 Hence, a 'liability rule" 3 6 imposing an award of damages is
considered to be a more efficient remedy for breaches of contract, as it
would permit to buy a legal way out of the contract.1 3 7
It is submitted that this theory is unworkable and defective. The
theory of efficient breach has its roots in common law systems and the
expansion of the theory from the U.S. law to civil law systems and even
to England may face a considerable number of obstacles on the practical
level (e.g. - disgorgement remedy aimed at surrendering the gain the
133 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw (7th edn, Aspen Publishers 2007) 131.
134 Rosalyn Higgins, 'The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in
International Law' 176 Recueil des cours 259 (The Hague 1983) 263.
135 Ronald Scalise, 'Why No "Efficient Breach" in the Civil Law?: A Comparative
Assessment if the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract' (2007) 55 Am. J. Comp.
L. 721, 733-734.
136 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, 'Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral' (1982) 85 Harvard L. Rev. 1089.
137 Barak Medina, 'Renegotiation, 'Efficient Breach' and Adjustement: The Choice of
Remedy for Breach of Contract as a Choice of a Contract-Modification Theory', in
Cohen and McKendrick (eds), Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (n 18)
52.
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debtor received from the 'efficient breach' to the creditor).138 For
instance, English law permits creditors to recover the profits debtors have
gained by breaching agreements.1 3 9 This would discourage the debtor to
breach the contract if the additional sum he will receive from a third-
party will need to be transferred to the creditor. Moreover, a U.S. court,
applying English law (Rookes v Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129), awarded
punitive damages for a contractual breach, as debtor's conduct has been
calculated by him to make a profit which may well exceed the
compensation payable to the plaintiff.140 Punitive damages would be a
real deterrent for efficient breaches.
It is sometimes inaccurately argued that the exception of severe
hardship available under different legal systems compared above is a
reflection of the efficient breach theory.141 But that exception needs to be
distinguished from the theory of efficient breach as the former sets out a
higher threshold, and the opportunity costs do not seem to be part of the
test under the severe hardship defence.142
The theory of efficient breach has provoked extensive debates in the
academic circles. Apart from general objections to the economic analysis
of law,143 the economic approach to the specific performance has been
criticised on grounds of morality and sanctity of contracts.144 It is even
doubtful that the theory of efficient breach accounts properly for real
economic behaviour. The theory, being part of the neoclassical
138 Qi Zhou, 'Is Seller's Efficient Breach Possible under English Sale Law?' (2008)
24 J Contract L. 268.
139 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268.
140 Ronald Brand, 'Punitive Damages and the Recognition of Judgments' (1996) 43
Neth. Int'lL. Rev. 143, 169.
141 Gerrit de Geest, 'Specific Performance, Damages and Unforeseen Contingencies
in the Draft Common Frame of Reference', in Pierre Larouche and Filomena Chirico
(eds), Economic Analysis of the DCFR (Sellier 2010) 126.
142 Faust and Wiese (n 84) 58-59.
143 Guido Calabresi, 'The Pointlessness of Pareto' (1991) 100 Yale L. J 1211; Posner,
Economic Analysis ofLaw (n 133) 26-27.
144 Jones and Goodhart, Specific Performance (n 19) 3-4; Mak, Performance-Oriented
Remedies in European Sale of Goods Law (n 82) 68. It has been argued that efficient
breach is illegal as it implies taking of property, namely contractual rights (Daniel
Friedmann, 'The Efficient Breach Fallacy', (1989) 18 J Leg. Stud. 1, 13), or taking of
the creditor's patrimonial entitlement to performance (Lionel Smith, 'Understanding
Specific Performance', in Cohen and McKendrick (eds), Comparative Remedies for
Breach of Contract (n 18) 227).
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economical paradigm, assumes that efficiency of a breach would always
prompt the debtor to breach the contract. By contrast, behavioural
economics 45 questions the assumption of the neoclassical theory that
economic actors are always rational.146 In the real world, the behaviour of
economic actors is not always determined by self-interest but also by a
whole range of physical and psychological constraints. 14 7 Economic
actors may not breach the contract when it would be efficient to do so due
to the concerns of fairness,14 8 loyalty to the original creditor and lack of
will power. As a result, introduction of the rule on efficient breach would
not produce the predicted amount of efficiency in practice.
The lack of sufficient empirical evidence is sometimes invoked to
repulse conclusions of the theory of efficient breach as to the alleged
ineffectiveness of specific performance and, in particular, as to the pre-
breach and post-breach transaction costs generated by that remedy.14 9
Abstract discussions of transactions costs generated by an order of
specific performance seem to be very speculative. In any case, it seems
that the transactions costs facing two parties who are already in a
contractual relationship are less than the costs of litigation.150
Followers of the theory of efficient breach contend that it would be
more burdensome for the debtor to comply with the order of specific
performance, rather than for the creditor to suffer from the contract being
broken.151 Rather, the creditor needs to mitigate the damage caused by the
breach of contract' 5 2 by means of obtaining substitute performance.
145 See, e.g., Dan Ariely 'Papers' <http://web.mit.edu/ariely/www/MIT/papers.shtml>
accessedl5 April 2012.
146 See Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen, 'Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics' (2000) 88 Calif L. Rev. 1051.
147 Francesco Parisi and Vernon Smith (eds.), The Law and Economics ofIrrational
Behavior (Stanford University Press 2005)
14 8 Korobkin and Ulen (n 146) 1137-1138.
149 Paul Mahoney, 'Contract Remedies: General' in The Encyclopedia of Law &
Economics (2000) <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/4600book.pdf> accessed15 April
2012, 127.
150 Thomas Ulen, 'The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory
of Contract Remedies' (1984) 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341, 344.
151 Co-operative Insurance Society v Argyll Stores [ 1998] AC 1 15. Similarly, it is
argued that the creditor may have other motives to claim specific performance -
vengeance, desire to intimidate other debtors, etc. (Edward Yorio, 'In Defence of
Monetary Damages for Breach of Contract' (1982) 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1373).
152 Smith (n 144) 227.
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Others argue that the debtor would be subject to excessive burden only in
case of obligations to produce goods, rather than deliver them, as the
process of producing goods requires additional efforts and resources,
whereas, in case of an obligation to give, the contribution of resources
would not excessively burden the debtor.15 3
This objection to the specific performance can, nevertheless, be
discounted. It obscures the fact that damages awarded to the creditor can
in some cases be under-compensatory.1 54 Apart from frustration,
vexation 5 5 and reputation in the market which do not in all probability
appear in the calculation of damages, there is the issue of costs related to
the judicial determination of damages156 and of the risk of error in the
calculation of damages.157 Even when adequate damages are granted,
there could be considerable costs incurred in searching for substitute
goods or services.' Moreover, the award of damages can be rendered
under-compensatory by way of the operation of the principle of Hadley v
Baxendalel59 which limits the damages of the creditor to the foreseeable
lOSS.1 6 0 The risk of under-compensation will in some cases force the
creditor to incur costs to take additional precautions to cover the risk of
the breach of contract. 161 Furthermore, the creditor may encounter
practical problems in enforcing the judgment for a monetary award (e.g. -
collecting the damages award, the instability of currency rates),162 though
it remains true that similar enforcement problems may appear in the
153 Steven Shavell, 'The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach' (1984) 99 Q.
J. Econ. 121; Steven Shavell, 'Specific Performance Versus Damages For Breach Of
Contract: An Economic Analysis' (2006) 84 Tex. L. Rev. 831; William Bishop, 'The
Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract' (1985) 14 J. Leg. Stud. 299, 301, 304.
154 Alan Schwartz, 'The Case for Specific Performance' (1979) 89 Yale L.J. 271, 271.
155 Farley v Skinner (No 2) [2001] 3 WLR 899 (HL).
156 Walgreen v Sara Creek Property, 966 F. 2d 273 (7th Cir 1993) 277.
157 Geerte Hesen, Robert Hardy, 'Dutch Contract Remediesfrom a Law and
Economics Perspective, in Smits, Haas and Hesen (eds), Specific Performance in
Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives (n 84) 295-296.
158 Kronman (n 54) 363-364.
159 Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 156 ER 145.
160 Melvin Eisenberg, 'Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of
Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle of Contract Law' (2005) 23 Cal. L.
Rev. 975 1049.
161 Richard Craswell, 'Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach' (1987-1988) 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629.
162 Shael Herman, 'Specific Performance: A Comparative Analysis' (2003) 7 Edin. L.
Rev. 194 214 -215.
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course of enforcing an order for specific performance.
Turning to the requirement of mitigation of damages, it is argued
that the 'duty' to mitigate does not impose any duties in the ordinary
meaning of that word (rather, the creditor would be barred from requiring
damages if he did not mitigate the loss) and the doctrine of mitigation
should not act as a bar for the creditor to claim specific performance.163
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that, in a (non-
negligible) number of cases, the efficient breach of the contract would not
even be efficient according to the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion,
definedl 64 as the situation when one party is better off and can transfer
compensation to the other party to make it no worse off. This shows that
the theory of efficient breach can be biased towards the debtor 6 5 and can
ignore the expectations of the creditor.
On closer analysis, the remedy of specific performance is
economically efficient. Providing the courts with the power to grant
orders of specific performance will shift the burden of quantifying the
damage and avoiding any excessive burden on the debtor to the parties
who are able to substitute the specific performance order by their post-
dispute settlement.166 That being the case, the debtor would be able to buy
out his duty to perform the contract, thus permitting efficient breaches at
the end of the day. Leaving the function of quantifying the damage to the
parties would also have a distributional effect, partially allocating the
price that was proposed by a third-party to the original creditor.' 6 7 The
price renegotiated between the debtor and creditor would take into
account the sum the new buyer is ready to pay to the debtor, whereas the
damages award would have ignored that factor.
163 Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract (n 123)
109-112.
164 Mitchell Polinshky and Steven Shavell (eds), Handbook ofLaw and Economics
(Amsterdam, 2007) Vol. II 505.
165 Only in exceptional cases, when the creditor is under the risk of leaving the
business (Sky Petroleum Ltd. v VI.P. Petroleum Ltd. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 576), the use of
the theory of efficient would be legitimate. Compare to the U.S. case-law that grants
specific performance to protect the plan of 'doing business' (Victor Goldberg,
Framing Contract Law: An Economic Perspective (Harvard University Press 2006)
213).
166 Walgreen v Sara Creek Property, 966 F. 2d 273 (7th Cir 1993) 275-276; Kronman
(n 55) 353.
167 Ogus (n 54) 259-260.
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However, it is correctly ascertained that costs of renegotiation
incurred to renegotiate the order of specific performance should not be
overlooked.16 8 When the costs are so high that no agreement would be
reached between the parties, the court must intervene to award money
damages.16 9 Furthermore, in some markets the third-party would be able
to locate the initial creditor of the contract and negotiate with him the
option of buying out the specific performancei70 by way of contractual
assignment. However, risk-averse third parties may be reluctant to
proceed in this way as the assignment carries an element of risk
associated with the potential intervention of third parties (e.g. - creditors
of the assignor).
The analysis hitherto suggests that, when the transaction costs are
not prohibitive, neither of the remedies is efficient per se, as both the
damages rule and specific performance permit an efficient breach of the
contract.17 1 The real effectiveness of a remedy can be measured only by
comparing transaction costs incurred by the parties when negotiating the
possibility to buy out the right to specific performance.17 2
It has been suggested from an ex ante perspective that the
probability of getting what is contracted via the order of specific
performance can act as an incentive for the parties to continue contracting
in future. 17 3 The parties would feel more confident that no policy
considerations of courts would stand in their way of getting what they
expected to receive. To this one could object that the possibility of a
breach of contract and of a dispute arising at the stage of performance of
the contract would not be considered to be realistic in the course of
negotiating the contract. It is notable that the Australian Government has
recently announced that it would not include any dispute settlement
provisions into the Bilateral Investment Treaties signed on its part. This
168 Kronman (n 55).
169 Ulen (n 150) 401-402.
170Lewis Kornhauser, 'An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract
Remedies' (1986) 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683, 715.
171 Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, 'Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement
to Facilitate Coasean Trade' (1995) 104 Yale L. J. 1027, 1098-1099.
172 Ian Macneil, 'Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky' (1982) 68 Virg. L.
Rev. 947.
173 Friedmann (n 18) 7; Jones and Goodhart, Specific Performance (n 19) 4; Kimel,
From Promise to Contract. Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract (n 123) 107-108.
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decision was supported by the economic analysis to the effect that dispute
settlement provisions do not in reality affect the decision taken by
investors to invest in Australia. 74
These objections notwithstanding, it seems likely that the
availability of specific performance may influence the desire to contract
when the parties are able to choose the applicable law. The availability of
specific performance would not impact the decision to contract when the
interested parties do not have any alternative. However, provided the
parties can change the regime with minimal costs, they will opt for the
general availability of specific performance. 175
Finally, it has been shown above that the EU optional instrument on
contractual obligations is intended to be applicable within the context of
arbitration. However, arbitrators do not share the concerns and objectives
of the judiciary. 176 Efficiency concerns are absolutely valid for state
organs such as courts. By contrast, an arbitral tribunal is constituted for
the single purpose of litigating the dispute between (generally) two
commercial parties. One might question whether a party-constituted
tribunal needs to worry about the impact of a remedy upon wider society?
D. LEGAL CERTAINTY
The analysis thus far suggests that there are no insurmountable theoretical
objections to the remedy of specific performance. It is submitted in this
chapter that the requirement of legal certainty militates in favour of the
general availability of specific performance in the European Union. It is a
truism that legal certainty, understood as previsibility of the judicial
decision to parties to a dispute, is of paramount importance for
contracting parties, especially risk-averse contractors.
The need for legal certainty is self-evident in the contractual
domain, as the parties committing themselves to obligations need to be
able to foresee the fate of such obligations. Certainty about the fate of
commitments undertaken by parties would arguably foster the conclusion
of contracts.
174 The Productivity Commission 'Some specific provisions in BRTAs',
<http://www.pc.gov.au/data/assets/pdf file/0009/104220/17-chapterl4.pdf>
accessedl5 April 2012, 256.
175 For a discussion see Part D below.
176 Schneider (n 102) 4-5.
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It is likely that the certainty concerns are particularly vigorous
within the framework of an internal European common market. It is
argued that the process of European integration leads to an increase of
legal certainty and minimisation of judicial discretion. The expansion of
the European Union law has the effect of shrinking such discretion. This
happened in regard to the doctrine of forum non conveniens and to the
'proper law of contract' analysis, both abandonned in favour of Brussels
1177 and Rome I Regulations respectively. Thus, the European Court of
Justice in Owusu v Jackson has invalidated the use of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens by which English courts retained high degree of
discretion as being inter alia contrary to the legal certainty.7 7 A similar
metamorphose has undergone the approach of English courts with regard
to the choice-of-forum agreements.1 7 9 English courts lost the wide
discretion they had enjoyed under all mentioned doctrines.
It is submitted that the wave of certainty will reach the remedy of
specific performance too. Remedy of specific performance in the DCFR
is based on the premise of legal certainty.1s Despite the fact the DCFR is
using such vague concepts as 'good faith', 'reasonableness', 'excessive',
etc., it provides quite certain solutions for the issue of remedies.
Existence of flexible rules directing the process of ordering specific
performance is not incompatible with the certainty in remedies'8 ' and
does not qualify as judicial discretion.' 82
The situation is different under English law. English law has always
underlined the fact that judges granting the order for specific
performance, a type of equitable remedy, have discretionary power to do
17 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 12,
16.1.2001).
178 Owusu v Jackson C-281/02 [2005] ECR 1-1383, [38].
179 Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Eleftheria v Owners of the Eleftheria
[ 1969] 2 W.L.R. 1073; Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Fehmarn v
Owners of the Fehmarn (The Fehmarn) [ 1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 551.
0 von Bar and Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules ofEuropean Private
Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (n 7) 830.
181 Friedmann (n 18) 16-17.
182 Lando and Beale, Principles ofEuropean Contract Law: Parts I and II (n 14) 396.
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so.183 With respect to Lord Hoffman's declaration that there are 'well-
established principles which govern the exercise of the discretion',184 it
has to be noted that the Court of Appeal correctly stated in Warren v
Mendy that granting a discretionary remedy such as an order for specific
performance:
depends on the infinitely variable facts of the individual case. Although
statements of the principles on which the discretion ought to be exercised in
some particular area are often authoritative, they are principles of practice rather
than of law, whose application may be rendered inappropriate by the finest of
factual variations between one case and another. 85
It would be inconceivable to import a common-law type of judicial
discretion in a codified, civil-law-type instrument such as the DCFR.
Judges in the countries of civil law are more used to applying
straightforward provisions of civil codes, rather than utilising a high
degree of discretion.
It by no means follows, however, that granting discretion to judges
is worse than the more straightforward and mechanical approach of civil
law countries. Nevertheless, the rule on specific performance must be
seen within the context of European integration and creation of internal
market. The desire to create a common market requires to adjust the
judicial process to the necessities of European common market and to
sacrifice some national law particularities. Legal certainty will certainly
contribute to the promotion of internal market, which is one of the
principles of European Union and also underlies the DCFR project.186
The reasoning above suggests that the territorial scope of application
of the DCFR shall be limited to the territory of the European Union
territory, considering that the English traditional approach is only
183 Co-operative Insurance Society v Argyll Stores [ 1998] AC 1 (HL) 9, where Lord
Hoffmann stated: 'A decree of specific performance is of course a discretionary
remedy...'.
184 ibid 11, 16. See also Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (n 40)
457.
185 Warren v Mendy [1989] 1 WLR 853, 860.
186 von Bar and Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private
Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (n 7) 23.
187 Compare to the territorial limitation of remedies of specific performance under
English law (see Part B.2 above).
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abandoned for the sake of providing legal certainty within the European
legal space. In other cases, the traditional English approach shall be left
untouched. For this reason, the desire of the European commission to
extend the DCFR to domestic issues' 88 should be doubted.
It should be observed that non-discretionary specific performance is
already adopted on the EU sector-specific level. Directive 1999/44/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees vests the
creditor with the right to require repair and replacement of goods (Art.
3(3)).189 Nonetheless, the question of whether the latter Directive trumps
the reluctance of English law to afford specific performance and the
desire to keep discretionary powers is still moot,190 and a review of the
general English approach towards specific performance is advised.191
E. CONCLUSION
The analysis offered in this dissertation favours the general availability of
specific performance. Legal systems vary in their approaches to the
availability of the said remedy. As a result, one of the approaches needs
to be preferred, if the route of Europeanisation is undertaken. Having
shown that the theoretical objections to the specific performance can be
overcome, it was stressed that the remedy of specific performance fosters
legal certainty which is a necessary prerequisite for the construction of an
internal common market. A quotation from the House of Lords neatly
concludes the point:
Although the list [of divergences from English law] contains topics of
fundamental importance, it is important to remember that the DCFR represents
188 Green Paper from the Commission on Policy Options for Progress towards a
European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses (n 3) 12.
189 Aneta Wiewiorowska-Domagalska, 'Certain Aspects of the Right of Repair and
Replacement under EC Directive 1999/44 and its Implementation in Poland', in
Smits, Haas and Hesen (eds), Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and
Other Perspectives (n 84) 133.
190 Some commentators consider that this rule would prevail over the discretionary
analysis of English law. See D.R. Harris, 'Specific Performance - a Regular Remedy
for Consumers?' (2003) 119 LQR 541, 543.
191 Vanessa Mak, 'Specific Performance in English Consumer Law', in Smits, Haas
and Hesen (eds), Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other
Perspectives (n 84) 122-125.
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a compromise between lawyers coming from different legal systems. It is not
only English law that would have to undergo changes if the CFR were to be
adopted as a legally binding instrument. Other legal systems would have to
adapt as well. 192
192 House of Lords, European Contract Law: The Draft Common Frame of Reference
(n 6) 4.
